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A LOGIC FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
KEVIN W. SAUNDERS· 
The principle of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion I asserts that 
once an issue of ultimate fact2 has been determined by a valid and final 
judgment in litigation, that issue cannot be relitigated between the same 
parties. 3 The principle's importance has increased greatly during the 
past fifteen years. An established rule of federal criminal procedure 
since 1916,4 collateral estoppel became a constitutional requirement of 
due process enforceable against the states in 1970.5 On the civil side, 
the determination that mutuality is not required for collateral estoppel 
to apply6 and that the principle may be used offensively,1 as well as the 
increase in mass tort cases,8 have added to the principle's scope of 
© Copyright reserved 1986 by Kevin W. Saunders. 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. A.B., Franklin and Mar-
shall College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan. 
I. The phrases "collateral estoppel" and "issue preclusion" are interchangeable. 
See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.16, at 618 (3d ed. 1985) ("This ... 
effect of a judgment was called 'collateral estoppel' and is now called 'issue preclusion'. "). 
2. Ultimate facts are facts necessary and essential for any determination or decision 
by the court. People ex reI. Hudson & M.R. Co., 44 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1943). 
3. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). 
4. [d. (citing United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916». For applications 
of collateral estoppel in federal criminal cases subsequent to 1916, see, e.g., Sealfon v. 
United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 (1948); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 335-38 
(1957); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 passim (1979). 
5. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 436-37 (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), 
where the Court held that the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is en-
forceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment). 
6. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of III. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
Mutuality required that, unless both parties in a second action were bound by a judgment 
in a previous case, neither could be; that is, collateral estoppel applied only when both 
parties to the second suit were parties to, or in privity with parties to, the earlier suit in 
which the issue was litigated and determined. [d. at 320-21. See also Bernhard v. Bank of 
Am., 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) (earlier state rejection of the mutuality require-
ment by the California Supreme Court). 
7. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Parklane also discusses 
the appropriate circumstances for the use of offensive collateral estoppel, i.e., the use by a 
second plaintiff of a fact found in an earlier suit against the same defendant. See also 
United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. & D. Nev. 1962) 
(earlier case allowing offensive use under some circumstances), affd sub nom. United Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964). 
8. In 1982 there were 
pending in federal and state courts over 16,000 asbestos-related lawsuits, over 
1,500 "Dalkon Shield" cases, at least 1,000 DES cases, nearly 1,000 cases alleg-
ing separate design defects against two car manufacturers, over 500 cases stem-
ming from exposure to formaldehyde foam insulation, several hundred Agent 
99 
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application. 
If collateral estoppel applied only to judgments, its application would 
be straightforward; however, it applies not only to the judgment, but 
also to all issues essential to thatjudgment,9 which raises the problem of 
determining just what facts were found in the earlier proceeding. It is a 
determination that is often difficult. 
[I]n criminal cases tried before a jury ... [t]he precise determination 
of what a jury decided and why can be particularly difficult. In non-
jury cases an appellate court is presented with the decision of a trial 
judge and an explanation of his reasoning. But non-jury verdicts are 
the exception rather than the rule. 10 
Special findings of fact, which are common in a civil trial, facilitate the 
identification of the issues that were litigated. Furthermore, if the mat-
ter was tried before a jury, jury interrogatories or a special verdict may 
prove helpful. But if the jury determined a general verdict, ascertaining 
the precise issues determined may be difficult. II 
The Supreme Court has stated that "the rule of collateral estoppel ... 
is ... to be applied ... with realism and rationality," 12 but the informal 
analysis used by appellate courts leads to little certainty in the establish-
ment of precisely what was determined. Often the conclusion is simply 
Orange lawsuits, and hundreds of other cases involving exposure to various 
chemical products. In addition, scores of cases have been filed by plaintiffs who 
were injured or had relatives that were killed in plane, train or bus accidents. 
Gunn, The Offensive Use oj Collateral Estoppel in Mass Tort Cases, 52 MISS. L.J. 765, 
765-66 (1982) (footnotes omitted). 
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68(j) (tent. draft no. 4 1977). 
10. United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1095 (3d Cir. 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 10 
(1980). See also Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L. REV. 
281,291 (1980) (recognizing the general difficulty of ascertaining what issues have been 
decided in making the general finding where the first case was a criminal prosecution, but 
also noting that in such a situation a determination may be possible either from an exami-
nation of the evidence presented or where the court has found facts specially, as under 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c». 
II. Vestal, supra note 10, at 291. See also Note, Invoking Collateral Estoppel Offen-
sively: The Ends oj Justice . .. or the End oj Justice?, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 75, 87 
(1980) ("There also exists a real possibility that the verdict in the former adjudication was 
the result of a jury compromise .... When collateral estoppel is then asserted the effect is 
to require subsequent courts to accept as decided, issues which may not have, in fact, been 
decided. ") (footnotes omitted). 
Seemingly contrary on the issue of prior civil determinations' being somewhat less diffi-
cult than criminal ones is Thau, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability oj Criminal Deter-
minations: Theoretical, Practical, and Strategic Implications Jor Criminal and Civil 
Litigation, 70 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1114 (1982) ("Determining the findings essential to crimi-
nal cases may be easier than for civil cases because criminal offenses tend to be exclusively 
statutory.") (footnote omitted). But, Thau was considering the use of criminal convictions 
in later civil cases. Thau also admits, however, that "such determinations can be difficult, 
if not impossible, to prove in some cases." Id. 
12. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). 
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a bald assertion, perhaps reflecting more the appellate judge's view of 
the facts (or the view of the second trial judge) than a reasoned determi-
nation of the jury's view and leaving a great deal of room for 
disagreement. 13 
At least part of the problem with the absence of much formal analysis 
may be due to the lack of an applicable system of logic with which to 
structure the reasoning. Courts have been instructed that to determine 
whether collateral estoppel applies they are to "examine the record of 
the prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, 
charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury 
could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the 
[party] seeks to foreclose from consideration.,,14 However, currently 
available logic provides no guidance in that determination. 
Treating findings of fact as true propositions in standard proposi-
tional logic is inadequate. In addition to epistemological objections 
over whether the findings are true, there are more serious logical 
problems. Findings of fact are probability based,15 while the proposi-
tional calculus is two-valued. When findings are combined, the inap-
propriateness of propositional logic becomes apparent. 
As an example, consider a case in which there have been findings of 
p, p implies q, q implies r, r implies s, ... , and y implies z. If each 
finding is taken as a true logical proposition, the truth of z follows logi-
cally from the findings; however, p and each of the implications has 
been established probabilistically. While there may be sufficient 
probability for p and p implies q each to be taken as a finding, q may not 
be sufficiently probable. Since q only probably follows from p, its 
probability may be less than that of p. As the chain of implications is 
followed, the probability of the conclusions may eventually drop below 
the level required for a finding of fact. The propositional calculus de-
rives conclusions equal in strength to the propositions on which they 
are based, but where probabilistically based claims are combined, the 
13. Compare, e.g., Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445 ("The single rationally conceivable issue in 
dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers. And the 
jury by its verdict found that he had not.") with 397 U.S. at 467 (Burger, C.l., dissenting) 
("The majority's analysis of the facts disregards the confusion injected into the case by the 
robbery of Mrs. Gladson .... [T]he jury could well have acquitted Ashe yet believed that 
he was present in the Gladson home."). 
14. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948). 
15. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 957 (3d ed. 1984) ("The most acceptable mean-
ing to be given to the expression, proof by a preponderance, seems to be proof which leads 
the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its 
nonexistence. "). 
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strengths of the conclusions drop.16 An analysis that adequately han-
dles findings of fact must account for the probabilistic strength of the 
propositions involved. 
A situation in which there have been findings of p and q presents a 
second example. If p and q are taken as true logical propositions, the 
truth ofthe conjunction, p and q, would follow. Such should not be the 
case with findings. Findings are probabilistically based, and the 
probability of a conjunction is less than or equal to the probability of 
either conjunct. 17 So while p and q may each be sufficiently probable to 
be taken as found, the probability of the conjunction may fall below the 
threshold level for a finding of fact. 18 
The problems with propositional logic seem to indicate the need for a 
probability-valued logic or for the assignment of probabilities to find-
ings 19 and the mathematical calculation of the probabilities of related 
propositions. Both of these alternatives, however, have their costs. 
First, each would require the abandonment of two-valued logic-a logic 
that has proven to be a powerful tool in the analysis of arguments in 
many areas; second, neither alternative can comprehend the possibility 
of a proposition being both probable and false. 2o While there has been 
debate over whether a proposition can be probable but false (or improb-
16. The problem is similar to one noted in L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE 
PROVABLE 68-73 (1977). 
17. For example, the probability of an integer between one and ten, inclusive, se-
lected at random being even is one-half. The probability of that integer being greater than 
five is also one-half. The probability of its being even and greater than five is three-tenths. 
Generally, requiring the selected element to have two characteristics cannot result in the 
selection of more elements than requiring the selected e1ement to have one, but not neces-
sarily the other, characteristic. 
18. Similar problems would result with findings of p or q and not-po Treating the 
findings propositionally would allow the inference of q. Such an inference should not 
hold for probabilistically based propositions. If an integer is selected at random from 
among I, 2, 3, it is probable that 2 or 3 was selected. It is also probable that 2 was not 
selected. But, it is not probable that 3 was selected. 
19. There are difficulties in the assignment of probabilities in legal analysis. See gen-
erally L. COHEN, supra note 16. The analysis envisioned here, however, would be em-
ployed only after there have been some findings. Those findings might then be assumed to 
have some probability value greater than k, where k is some selected level greater than or 
equal to one-half but less than one (greater than one-half in cases involving a higher 
standard of proof). An algebraic calculation, using the laws of probability, would then 
identify other logically related propositions whose probabilities are also greater than k. 
20. The probability assigned to a false proposition would have to be close to (or equal 
to) zero, but a proposition that is probable would have a probability greater than one-half. 
Since assigning a probability value is the only way to express "true," "false," "probable," 
or "improbable" in a probability-valued logic or probability calculus, expressing the fact 
that a proposition is probable but false requires the assignment of two inconsistent 
probability values. Improbable but true propositions present a similar problem. 
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able but true),21 there are easily constructed examples showing that 
such propositions exist. Such an example results from the roll of a die, 
where the outcome is not seen. It is probable that there are more than 
two spots on the upper face, but in roughly one-third of the repetitions 
it will also be false. 
Similarly, it may be desirable for a logical analysis to be capable of 
interpreting a situation in which a proposition has been found as fact 
but is actually false. If a fact-finder is anything less than perfect, such 
situations will occur. Indeed, the imposition of a burden of proof cre-
ates the possibility of a proposition not found as fact being true. 
Admittedly, it is very unlikely that a collateral estoppel argument 
will require the consideration of a situation in which a proposition 
found as fact is false, since once found as fact, it cannot be argued to be 
false in a collateral proceeding. Nevertheless, if an analysis that can 
comprehend such a situation may be had at little or no cost, it would 
seem preferable to an analysis that logically requires the truth of a prop-
osition that has been found as fact. The cost of the system to be devel-
oped here is the inability to express precise probability values. The 
system can only express the fact that the probability either exceeds or 
fails to exceed some value greater than or equal to one-half. But, this is 
not a major loss, since that is all that is indicated by a finding of fact at 
trial. Furthermore, the logic to be developed here will have application 
in the analysis of other areas involving findings of fact, and in those 
areas the combined analysis of findings, true or false propositions and 
conceptually necessary or possible propositions may be useful. 
Part I of this article examines how a logic may be developed that can 
comprehend probabilistically based propositions within a two-valued 
framework, thus maintaining the possibility of a proposition being 
found as fact and also being false. In Parts II and III such a logic will 
be developed. Lastly, Part IV presents examples of the application of 
this logic. 
I. A MODAL TREATMENT OF JURY DELIBERATIONS 
An intuitive explanation of the logic to be developed here may be 
found in the possible worlds description of modal logic. Modal logic22 
is the logic of necessity and possibility. It recognizes that some proposi-
21. Compare Toulmin, Probability, reprinted in EsSAYS IN CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
157 (A. Flew ed. 1956) with King-Farlow, Taulmin's Analysis of Probability, 29 THEORIA 
12 (1963). 
22. See generally C. LEWIS & c. LANGFORD, SYMBOLIC LOGIC (1932); G. VON 
WRIGHT, AN ESSAY IN MODAL LOGIC (1951). 
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tions must be true, while others may be true or false and still others 
cannot be true. 23 The possible worlds analysis considers all the possible 
worlds or states of affairs that are alternatives to the actual. 24 The nec-
essary propositions are those that must be true under every alternative. 
Propositions are possible, if they are true under some alternative, and 
impossible, if they are true in no alternative world. 
The treatment of probability in the possible worlds explanation rests 
on interpreting it as the ratio of the number of possible worlds in which 
the proposition is true to the totality of possible worlds. 25 In each 
23. There are several bases for a claim that a proposition must be true. The proposi-
tion may be tautological (logically necessary), necessary within the context of a theory 
(theoretically necessary) or conceptually necessary. See D. SNYDER, MODAL LOGIC AND 
ITS ApPLICATIONS 167-78 (1971). Similarly, propositions may be self-contradictory (logi-
cally impossible), impossible within the context of a theory (theoretically impossible) or 
inconceivable (conceptually impossible). 
24. For a development of the possible worlds semantics, see Kripke, Semantic Analy-
sis of Modal Logic I: Normal Modal Propositional Calculus, 9 ZEITSCHRIFfE FUR 
MATHEMATISCHE LOGIK UNO GRUNDLAGEN DER MATHEMATIK 67 (1963). 
Kripke's development starts with model structures, which are ordered triples (G, W, 
R), where W is a set, G is an element of W, and R is a reflexive relation (a relation in 
which everything relates to itself and possibly to others as well; that is, for every H, H 
relates to H (written HRH) on W. W may be interpreted as the set of all possible worlds 
or equiprobable states of affairs, G as the actual world or actually existing state of affairs 
and R as the relation "has access to" or "is able to examine." 
Models on these structures are binary functions, f(p,H), which assigns a truth value ° , 
or I for each proposition, p, and each world, H, belonging to W, Truth values for com-
pound formulae are assigned as follows: 
If f(p,H) = f(q,H) = I, then f(p&q,H) = I, where p&q represents the conjunc-
tion of p and q; otherwise, f(p&q,H) = 0. 
If f(p,H) = I, then f( - p,H) = 0, where - p represents the negation of p; other-
wise, f( - p,H) = I. 
f(pvq,H) = I, iff(p,H) = lor f(q,H) = I, wherepvq represents the disjunction 
of p and q; otherwise, f(pvq,H) = 0, 
f(p--->q,H) = 0, if f(p,H) = I and f(q,H) = 0, where p-q represents the mate-
rial implication of q from p; otherwise, f(p--->q,H) = I. 
f(p-<i,H) = I, if f(p,H) = f(q,H), where p+-+fJ represents material equivalence; 
otherwise, f(p_q,H) = 0, 
f(Lp,H) = I, if f(p,H') = I for each H' such that H has access to H' (i,e" 
HRH'), where Lp represents "p is necessary"; otherwise, f(Lp,H) = 0. 
f(Mp,H) = I, if f(p,H') = I for some H' such that HRH', where Mp represents 
"p is possible"; otherwise, f(Mp,H) = 0, 
Kripke took R to be a reflexive relation, and (G, W, R) and fthen provided a model for 
Feys' modal system T, see Feys, Les Logiques Nouvelles des Modalites, 40 REVUE NEOS-
CHOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE 517 (1937), or von Wright's equivalent system M, See G. 
VON WRIGHT, supra note 22, If R is also transitive (if ARB and BRC, then ARC), then a 
model for Lewis' S4 results, See C. LEWIS & c. LANGFORD, supra note 22. at 492-502. 
Adding symmetry (if ARB. then BRA) to reflexivity and transitivity yields a model for 
Lewis' S5. See id, On the other hand. dropping the reflexive property in favor of an 
existence requirement (there is some H' such that HRH') yields a model for the logic Mn. 
See G, VON WRIGHT, supra note 22, 
25. To interpret probability values within the formal model we will restrict the order 
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world the proposition is either true or false and the system as a whole is 
two-valued, yet probability values may be interpreted. If the probability 
exceeds some set value greater than or equal to one half, the proposition 
is probable (or may be taken as a finding offact).26 It may be so desig-
nated in the logical system and the relation of the probable statements 
(or findings of fact) to other propositions may be examined within a 
two-valued context. Such a treatment is consistent with the position 
developed earlier with regard to the probable proposition (or the propo-
sition found as fact) and truth. 27 While there is an implication of the 
truth of a proposition from its necessity and of possibility from truth, 
there is no such logical connection between the probable (or findings) 
and truth. The fact that a proposition is true in more than some fixed 
proportion of worlds does not guarantee that the proposition is true in 
any particular world, including the actual. Nor does its truth in the 
actual world guarantee its truth in the required proportion of worlds. 
of W in the model structure so that W is finite. See supra note 24. For each H in W we 
will let J(H) be the set of all H' in W to which H has access; i.e., 
J(H) = jH' I H'EW and HRH' f. 
Given a proposition, p, with a probability value, v, in world H, assign truth values 0 or 
I to p in each world H' in J(H) so that the sum of the f(p,H')s over J(H) equals v; that is, 
so that 
~ 
H'EJ(H) 
n 
f(p,H') 
= v. 
Note that n # 0, since under either the reflexive or the existence property there is at 
least one world in J(H). 
There are shortcomings to this approach. First, given the limitation on the number of 
worlds in which truth values may be assigned, probability values may need to be approxi-
mated. Secondly, a finite number of worlds can model only a finite number of proposi-
tions. While more mathematically sophisticated methods might be employed to remedy 
these problems, the problems are actually of no concern here. Given the inexact 
probabilities involved in collateral estoppel analysis and the limited number of proposi-
tions of interest in any given analysis, the model presented is adequate. 
26. The Kripke model, see supra note 24, is extended by introducing Fp which is 
interpreted as p is probable or p has been found in fact. Hereinafter writing 
~ 
H'EJ(H) as ~, we let 
f(Fp,H) = I, if ~f(p~H') > k; otherwise, f(Fp,H) = o. 
K must be greater than or equal to one-half and in legal applications is determined by the 
evidentiary level required (although the probability levels represented by "clear and con-
vincing" and "beyond a reasonable doubt" are unclear). K will be taken as one-half in all 
further discussion of the model, but this does not result in any loss of generality. The 
arguments to be presented could be reconstructed using any value for k greater than one-
half but less than one. 
27. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
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The interpretation also preserves the fact that a proposition and its 
negation cannot both be probable. The proportion of worlds in which p 
is true and the proportion in which its negation -pis true cannot both 
exceed one half, since a proposition and its negation cannot both be true 
in any particular world. Carried over to the legal interpretation, a jury 
may not find as fact both a proposition and its negation. 
Another property preserved by the model is that it may occur that 
neither p nor -pis probable, as where each is true in exactly half the 
worlds that may be examined. Therefore, from the fact that p is not 
probable one cannot infer that -p is probable. In the trial process the 
burden of proof will determine the outcome in such a case; however, it 
would not seem correct to claim that the burden has determined any 
factual findings. It simply determines the conclusion, when the jury has 
failed to find either p or -p. 
Despite the possibility that in the model neither p nor -p is found, 
there are situations (where a presumption exists) in which one alterna-
tive must be found. Since it is not true in the model that either Fp (p is 
found) or F - P (-pis found) must be true, presumptions will not arise 
as a result of the logic. Rather, if a presumption is involved in a case, it 
must be taken as a supposition in the particular analysis. If there is a 
rebuttable presumption p, it will be expressed as the implication: "if - P 
is not found, then pis found.,,28 An irrebuttable presumption p will be 
taken as the supposition that p is necessary (Lp); that is, p must be taken 
as true under any alternative state of affairs. Since jury instructions 
must also be applied to any alternative, they too will be taken as expres-
sing necessary propositions. 
Before turning to the actual development of the logical systems, a 
word should be said about differences in evidentiary strength. So long 
as the level above which a proposition is taken as found as fact (i.e., Fp 
is taken as true) is greater than or equal to one-half (but less than one), 
the logic will not change with changes in the level. An analysis involv-
ing findings by a preponderance will be the same as it would be if the 
findings were all by clear and convincing evidence or were found be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Difficulties may arise if findings of differing 
strengths are involved in one analysis;29 however, if all the findings are 
28. Other presumptions may take the form "if p is found, then q is found." While 
presumptions of this form may well be more common and as a result more interesting in 
application, the form discussed in the text is more interesting in the development of the 
logic, since it provides the only instance in which a finding of p can be inferred from a 
failure to find not-p, and not-p from a failure to find p. 
29. Note that this would also be a problem in the algebraic calculation of probability 
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reduced to the lowest evidentiary level involved, conclusions at that 
lowest level may be derived. 
We may now turn to the systems themselves. Since possible worlds 
analysis provides models for several modal logics, the extensions of 
those models will aid in the development of modal systems, incorporat-
ing those propositions found as fact that are extensions of those logics. 
The reasonableness of axioms may be checked against the models and 
the models will provide a source of counter-examples to show that cer-
tain formulae should not be theses.3o The development will proceed on 
two levels. In the text the systems will be presented in a rigorous but 
non-formal manner. The formality that is absent in the text may be 
found in the accompanying notes and in the appendices. 
II. THE SYSTEM Ff 
The logic Ff is developed as an extension of the modal logic T.3! It 
is obtained by appending additional primitive symbols, formation rules 
and axioms to those of T. 
The primitive symbols include variables representing propositions: 
p, q, r, ... ; 
unary operators representing necessity, negation and finding as fact: 
L, -, F; 
and a binary connective representing disjunction (the non-exclusive or): 
v. 
From these primitive symbols certain formulae, known as well-
formed formulae, may be constructed using combinations of the follow-
ing formation rules: 
1. A variable standing alone is a well-formed formula. 
2. If a is a well-formed formula, then so are La, - a and Fa. 
3. If a and f3 are well-formed formulae, then so is (avf3). Where no 
ambiguity results, parentheses may be omitted. 
There are also defined symbols representing conjunction, material im-
plication, logical equivalence and possibility: 
values. Since those values too are inexact, but merely exceed some value, calculations 
involving lesser evidentiary strength will not lead to conclusions at higher levels. 
30. Checking the axioms against the model also provides a relative consistency proof 
for the logic. The model is based in set theory, so interpreting the axioms in the model 
shows that they will not lead to any contradictions not already present in set theory. The 
use of the model to show that certain formulae should not be theses falls far short of a 
completeness proof and is not intended as such. 
31. See Feys, supra note 24. The system T is equivalent to the modal system M, 
developed by von Wright. See G. VON WRtGHT, supra note 22. 
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&, -+, +-+, and M.32 
&, -+ and +-+ follow rule three; that is, if a. and 13 are well-formed for-
mulae, then so are (a. & 13), (0.-+13) and (0.+-+13). M follows rule two; 
that is, if a. is a well-formed formula, then MOo is as well. 
It should be noted that, under the symbols and rules adopted, any 
well-formed formula of the standard propositional logic or of T will be a 
well-formed formula of FT. In addition, an axiomatic basis for proposi-
tional logic and for T, and transformation rules adequate for each, will 
be included in FT. Therefore, any thesis of the propositional calculus 
or of T will be a thesis of FT. 
The axioms of FT consist of the following: 
A 1 (pvp}-->p - If P or P is true, then p is true. 
A 2 p-+(pvq) - If P is true, then p or q is true. 
A 3 (pvq}-->( qvp) - If p or q is true, then q or p is true. 
A 4 (q~rH(pvq}-->(pvr» - If q implies r, then (p or q) implies (p 
or r). 
A 5 Lp-+p - If P is necessary, p is true, or alternatively, if p is true in 
every world, p is true in the actual world. 
A 6 L(p-+q}-->(Lp-+Lq) - If it is necessary that p implies q, then if p 
is necessary so is q, or alternatively, if p implies q in every 
world, then if p is true in every world q is true in every world. 
A 7 Lp-+Fp - If P is necessary, it is probable or must be found as 
fact. Alternatively, if p is true in every world, it is true in more 
than the needed proportion of worlds. 
A 8 -(Fp & F -p) - p and -p cannot both be found as fact (within 
the same analysis). 
A 9 F(p & q}-->(Fp & Fq) - If (p and q) is found as fact, p can be 
taken as found, as can q. 
A 10 (Lp & F (~)}-->Fq - If P is necessary and (p implies q) is 
found as fact, q may be taken as found. 
A 11 (Fp & L(~}-->Fq - If P is found as fact and p necessarily 
implies q, q may be taken as found. 
Axioms A 1 through A 4 provide an axiomatic basis for propositional 
logic, and the addition of A 5 and A 6 completes a basis for T. 
Axioms A 7 through A 11 are additional axioms for the operator F; 
that is, they incorporate findings of fact into the modal system. An 
examination of the possible worlds model would show that the axioms 
are reasonable choices to govern the use of F, if F is to be interpreted as 
indicating a probabilistically based legal finding. 33 
32. a&13 = d<f -(-av-l3) 
a~13 = d,r -avl3 
a .... 13 = d,r (- av(3) & (-l3va) 
Ma = d<f -L-a 
33. To see that A 7 holds in the model assume f(Lp,H) = I. Therefore, 
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All that remains to complete the basis for the logic is to add transfor-
.H(p,H') 
n 
n I 
- > 
n 2. 
So f(Fp,H) = I and Lp->Fp holds in the model. Put more simply, if p is true in every 
world, it must be true in at least half the worlds. 
Next consider Axiom A 8. For any p and any H either f(p,H) = I or f(p,H) = 0, in 
which case f( ~ p,H) = I. If it is assumed that f(Fp,H) = I = f(F ~ p,H), that is in some 
world, H, both P and ~p are found, then: 
1:f(p,H') > .!. and 1:f( ~ p,H') > I 
n 2 n 2. 
Therefore, 
1:f(p,H') 1:f( ~ p,H') 
n + n > I, 
and since each summation is over J(H) for the same H, then: 
1:f(p,H') + 1:f( ~p,H') 
n > I. 
However, since for each H', one of f(p,H') and f( ~p,H') equals one and the other zero, 
then: 
H(p,H') + 1:f( ~ p,H') n 
n n = I. 
This leads to I > I, a contradiction with the rules of arithmetic, so ~ (Fp&F ~p) holds in 
the model. 
To show that Axiom A 9 holds in the model assume f(F(p&q),H) = I. Then: 
1:f(p&q,H') > ~ 
n 2. 
However, whenever f(p&q,H') = I, f(p,H') = I, that is in any wold in whichp&q is true, 
p is true, so f(p,H') .:::. f(p&q,H') for each H'. Therefore 
1:f(p,H') 1:f(p&q,H') I 
n ~ n >2, 
so f(p,H) = I. The argument for Fq is the same, so F(p&q) (Fp&Fq) holds in the model. 
To show that A 10 holds assume f(Lp&F(p ->q),H) = I, so f(Lp,H) = 1 = 
f(F(p--q),H). Therefore, f(p,H') = I for each H' in J(H) and: 
If(p--q,H') > ~ 
n 2. 
For each H' in which p->q has truth value I, so does p. Since the propositional logic is 
assumed in each element of W, q will have truth value I in each H' in which p->q has 
truth value I. Also, if q has truth value 1 in an H', so does p--+q. Hence: 
H(q,H') 
n 
If(p->q,H') 1 
> -
n 2. 
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mation rules-rules that provide for the inference of one proposition 
from another (or others). The following rules are adequate for the sys-
tems developed here: 
1. Uniform Substitution - If any variable in a thesis is uniformly 
replaced by any well-formed formula, the result will be a thesis. 
2. Modus Ponens - If a and (a-+(3) are theses, so also is (3. (If a 
can be proved and so can (a-+(3), then (3 may be taken as proved.) 
3. Necessitation - If a is a thesis, so is La. (If a can be proved, it is 
necessary.) 
There are also rules which may be derived from the basis thus far 
presented. They are unnecessary in that anything that may be proved 
using the derived rules may be proved without them, but they are useful 
enough to justify their inclusion as rules. 
4. Conjunctive Simplification (CS) - If (a&f3) is a thesis, then so are 
a and 13. (The proof of (a and (3) is sufficient to prove a and to 
prove (3). 
5. Conjunctive Inference (CI) - If a and 13 are theses, so is (a&f3). 
(The proof of a and of 13 is sufficient to prove (a&f3).) 
6. Inference by Cases (IC) - If (af3), (a-+y), and (f3---+y) are theses, 
so is y. (If (a or (3) has been proved and each implies y, y is 
proved.). 
The deduction theorem also holds in systems using the transforma-
tion rules given here.34 Under that theorem, if one is attempting to 
prove the conditional (a-I3), it may be done by taking a as a presuppo-
sition and proving 13. Since indirect inference may be derived from the 
deduction theorem in a propositional calculus basis, it too will be al-
lowed. Indirect inference allows the proof of a (or -a) by showing 
that the assumption of -a (or a) leads to a logical contradiction. 
One last rule is to accept the substitution of equivalent well-formed 
Therefore, f(Fq,H) = 1 and (Lp&F(p->q))-->Fq holds in the model. 
Lastly, consider Axiom A 11 and assume f(Fq&L(p---+q),H) = 1. So, f(Fp,H) = 1 = 
f(L(p-+q),H). Therefore, f(p---q,H') = 1 for each H' in J(H) and: 
_~f....::(p:...:..,H_'.:....) 1 > -
n 2. 
For each H' in which p has the truth value 1, p->q also has truth value 1, so q will also 
have truth value 1. Therefore: 
~f(g,H') H(p,H') > .!.. 
n ~ n 2, 
so f(Fq,H) = 1 and Fp&L(p->q))-->Fq holds in the model. 
34. See Zeman, The Deduction Theorem in S4, S4.2 and S5, 8 NOTRE DAME J. OF 
FORMAL LOGIC 56 (1967). 
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formulae into any formula that is not a finding. 35 Where the formula 
within which the substitution is to take place is a finding, the substi-
tuted formula must be necessarily equivalent to the formula it 
replaces. 36 
Weare now ready to examine several theorems of Ff. 37 The first 
seven are theorems of T that will tell us nothing of findings directly but 
will be useful in the examination of findings. 
Theorem 1: L(p & q)~(Lp & Lq): If (p and q) is necessary, each of 
p and q is individually necessary, and vice versa. 
Theorem 2: L~ - M - p: The necessity of p is equivalent to the 
impossibility of not-po 
Theorem 3: M(pvq)~(MpvMq): If (p or q) is possible, either p is 
possible or q is possible, and vice versa. 
Theorem 4: M(p & q) ~ (Mp & Mq): If (p and q) is possible, then 
each singly is possible. 
Theorem 5: Lp ~ L(q ~ p): Ifp is necessary, then q will necessar-
ily imply p. Alternatively, if p is true in every alterna-
tive, then in every alternative q implies p. 
Theorem 6: (LpvLq) ~ L(pvq): If either p is necessary or q is nec-
essary, (p or q) is necessary. Alternatively, if p is true 
in every world or q is true in every world, p or q is true 
in every world. 
Theorem 7: L(p ~ q) ~ (Mp ~ Mq): If (p implies q) is necessary, 
then if p is possible so is q. Alternatively, if in every 
world p implies q, then if p is true in some world q is 
true in some world (in fact the same world in which p 
was true). 
The remaining theorems do involve findings of fact. 
Theorem 8: Fp ~ F(pvq): If there is a finding of p, then (p or q) 
may be taken as having been found. 
Theorem 9: F-~-Fp: Ifnot-p has been found,p cannot also be 
found as fact. 
Theorem 10: Fq~F(~: If q is found, (p implies q) may also be 
taken as found. 
Theorem 11: F(p & ~F(pvq): If (p and q) is found, (p or q) may 
be taken as found. 
Theorem 12: (F(pvq) & L-p~Fq: If (p or q) has been found but 
35. For a proof that the substitution of equivalents holds in formulae built using -, v 
and L as connectives, see G. HUGHES & M. CRESSWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODAL 
LOGIC 33-37 (1972). 
36. This need not be assumed as a rule but can be proved from Axioms A 10 and A 
\\ and from Theorem \, which requires the substitution of equivalents in its own proof 
but not within the scope of an "F". 
37. Proofs of the theorems stated in the text may be found in Appendix \, infra. 
Since the first six theorems are theorems of T, their proofs are not presented. They may 
be found in G. HUGHES & M. CRESSWELL, supra note 35, at 34-40. 
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the negation of p is conceptually necessary; i.e., p is 
inconceivable, then q may be taken as found. 
Theorem 13: ~F(pvq)-(~Fp & ~Fq): If (p or q) has not been 
found, then neither p nor q has been found. 
Theorem 14: L(~)-(Fp-Fq): If (p implies q) is conceptually 
necessary, then if p is found q is found. 
Theorem 15: (Lp & Fq)-F(p & q): If p is conceptually necessary 
and there is a finding that q, then (p and q) may be 
taken as found. 
Theorem 16: Fp-Mp: If p is found, p must be conceivable. 
Theorem 17: p-Mp: If p is true, p is possible (or conceivable). 
III. THE SYSTEM FS4 
One difficulty with the logic presented is that iterations of modalities 
may result through the operation of the axioms and theorems of FT. 
For example, it may be possible for both p and q to be found; that is, 
M(Fp & Fq) may be true. The operation of Theorem 4 on this formula 
yields M F P & M F q, which by conjunctive simplification will result in 
either M F P or M F q. M F P and M F q are examples of iterated 
modalities-a string of modalities attached to a well-formed formula. 
The interpretations of these particular iterations make sense within the 
system. The first would be interpreted as "It is possible that p be 
found." Indeed, this is the claim made by one opposing a motion for 
summary judgment.38 Other iterations, for example M L F Mp or even 
F F p make less or no sense under our interpretation of the symbols 
involved. However, such iterations may arise in proofs. To handle this 
situation a logic must be developed to allow the implication of a less 
complex iteration from a string of modalities. FS4 is such a logic. 
FS4 is an extension of FT that parallels the extension in modal logic 
of T to S4. The T to S4 extension is accomplished by adding the axiom 
Lp __ LLp-if P is necessary, it is necessary that p is necessary. The 
additional axiom may seem uninteresting, but it does provide for the 
reduction of strings of iterated modalities39 that do not involve F. An 
FS4 axiom must also be added if iterations involving F are also to be 
reduced.40 
38. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, § 4.10, at 206, 
and § 5.19, at 272-73. 
39. There are no infinite strings of modalities in S4. Any string of modalities reduces 
to one of the following: p, Lp, Mp, LMp, MLp, LMLp, MLMp. See G. HUGHES & M. 
CRESSWELL, supra note 35, at 45. 
40. The FS4 axiom will allow the implication of a shorter string of modalities from a 
string containing an F. Given the collapse of S4 iterations, see note 39 supra, what must 
be considered are: MF, FM, FL, LF, FF, LMF, MLF, LMLF, MLMF. They are consid-
ered infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. The other iterations-FLM, FML, FLML 
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In terms of the possible worlds model, the change to S4 (or FS4) is 
matched by the addition of the transitive property to the accessibility 
relation.41 If the actual world has access to examine an alternative and 
the alternative has access to examine a second alternative, the actual 
also has direct access to the second alternative.42 The reduction in the 
number of steps required in the examination of alternatives leads to the 
reduction in the strings of modalities. 
FS4 is constructed by adding an S4 axiom and an FS4 axiom: 
A 12 Lp -+ LLp 
A 13 FMp -+ Mp - If p is found to be conceivable, then p is 
conceivable.43 
to the axioms for FT. The formation and transformation rules remain 
the same and FS4 contains as theses all S4 or FT theses. 
Among the theses ofS4 that are useful in FS4 are those that follow.44 
Their English translations are not particularly interesting, but the theo-
rems are needed to prove more interesting theorems regarding findings. 
Theorem 18: Lp ...... LLp 
Theorem 19: Mp ...... MMp 
Theorem 20: LMp ...... LMLMp 
Theorem 21: MLp ...... MLMLp 
Theorem 22: MLMp -+ Mp. 
Additional FS4 theorems include the following: 
Theorem 23: FLp -+ Fp: Ifp is found to be conceptually necessary, 
p may be taken as found. 
Theorem 24: MFp -+ Mp: If it is conceivable that p be found, p is 
conceivable. 
Theorem 25: LFp -+ Fp: If it is conceptually necessary that p be 
found, p may be taken as found. 
Theorem 26: FFp -+ Mp: If it is found that p is found, then p is 
conceivable. 
Still other FS4 theorems follow. Their English translations are cumber-
and FMLM-will be instances of the iterations considered and will be governed by the 
rules for them. 
41. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
42. The transitive property may be expressed as: if H,RH, and H,RH3, then H,RH3• 
Alternatively, if H,RH" then J(H,) is a subset of J(H,). 
43. To show that FMp ..... Mp holds in the model let f(FMp,H) = 1. Then: 
If(Mp,H') > ~ 
n 2. 
Since J(H) is not empty, there is an H' in J(H) such that f(Mp,H') = 1. Therefore, there 
is an H" in J(H') such that f(p,H") = 1. However, J(H') is a subset of J(H), so H" is also 
in J(H) and f(p,H") = 1. Hence f(Mp,H) = 1 and FMp ..... Mp holds in the model. 
44. For proofs, see G. HUGHES & M. CRESSWELL, supra note 35, at 46-47. 
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some and the theorems are not particularly interesting in themselves, 
but they do provide for some simplification of more cumbersome 
expressIOns. 
Theorem 27: LMFp ---+ LMp 
Theorem 28: MLFp ---+ MFp 
Theorem 29: LMLFp ---+ MFp 
Theorem 30: MLMFp ---+ MFp 
Theorem 31: FLMLp ---+ MLp 
Theorem 32: FMLMp ---+ Mp 
Theorem 33: FMLp ---+ MLp 
Theorem 34: FLMp ---+ FMp 
Unfortunately, only conditionals, rather than equivalences, result in 
FS4. Hence, only implications of, rather than reductions to, shorter 
iterations are accomplished for formulae containing F. However, it was 
not a result that could be avoided by a better choice of an FS4 axiom.45 
IV. ApPLICATIONS 
Before turning to the analysis of collateral estoppel, it is interesting to 
note that the logic developed may also be used to derive additional find-
ings from facts specially found, instructions and presumptions. 
Example A: Suppose in a case there have been findings of (1) p or q, 
and (2) v. Suppose further that (3) s is conceptually necessary, (4) 
not-p is conceptually necessary, that (5) there has not been a finding 
of not-r, that (6) there is a presumption that r, and that (7) it is 
conceptually necessary that if v, then t. Suppose further that there 
is a jury instruction that (8) if the jury finds each of q, r, s, and t, 
then the jury must find u. Must the jury, based on (1)-(8), find u? 
Analysis:46 Since we have findings of (p or q) and that not-p is neces-
sary, then by Theorem 12 we may infer that q is found. 
A presumption of r is interpreted as the inference of Fr from 
45. The model provides counterexamples to show that the conditionals proven in 
theorems 23-33 cannot be replaced by biconditionals, if the possible worlds semantics is to 
be a model for the system. See infra Appendix 2. The counterexamples in Appendix 2 
are constructed to show also that the conditionals can not be "strengthened" to imply a 
"stronger" consequent. 
It is possible to develop an extension of the logic 55. See generally C. LEWIS & c. 
LANGFORD, supra note 22, incorporating the operator F. The addition of Mp-+L Mp and 
M Fp-+Fp as axioms would cause any string of modalities to be equivalent to the last 
modality in the string. See G. HUGHES & M. CRESSWELL, supra note 35, at 46-49; Bur-
gess, Probability Logic, 34 J. OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC 264 (1969). The resulting system 
would be equivalent to S5U developed by Burgess. The system would, however, contain 
unacceptable theses such as: "If p is conceivable, p may be taken as found." and "If it is 
possible that p is found, it is necessary that p is found." FS4 does not contain these 
Objectionable theses and seems adequate for our purposes. 
46. The analysis presented in the text is informal. Formal proofs of the conclusions 
reached in this example and in Example B may be found in Appendix 3. 
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- F - r (the inference that r is found from the fact that not-r has not 
been found), and since there has not been a finding of not-r, r may 
be taken as found. 
Axiom 7 states that if s is necessary, s may be taken as found. 
Since we have a finding of v and it is conceptually necessary that v 
implies t, Axiom A 11 allows the inference that t is found. 
Since q, r, sand t are all found, the jury instruction requires that 
u be found. 
The proposed conclusion may be validly drawn in the logic. 
We now tum to an example involving collateral estoppel. 
Example B: Suppose prior litigation has (1) failed to find p. In that 
litigation there was an (2) instruction that if the jury found q or r, 
then it must find p, and there was a (3) presumption of q. May not-
q be taken as established for collateral estoppel purposes? 
Analysis: Since the instructions allow the inference of a finding of p 
from a finding of (q or r) and there was no finding of p, there was no 
finding of (q or r). 
If (q or r) cannot be found, then by Theorem 13 neither q nor r 
may be found. In particular q is not found. 
Under the presumption, if not-q were not found, q would be 
found. This would contradict the conclusion that q is not found, so 
not-q must have been found. 
115 
Admittedly, most collateral estoppel analysis will not be so simple. 
Seldom will the record, instructions and presumptions be so complete 
as to make the answer to the collateral estoppel question follow logi-
cally. The situation more often will be like the following. 
Example C: Suppose a jury has failed to find t in a case in which there 
was a conclusive presumption of not-r and an instruction that if the 
jury found (p and q) and did not find r, they must find t. Maya 
later court conclude that p was not found? 
Any attempt to prove that p is not found (-Fp) within the logic will 
fail. 47 Yet, the logic may still be of value. An analysis may help pro-
vide insight into the case. 
Analysis: Findings of (p and q) and a failure to find r will require that 
t be found. T was not found, so either r was found or (p and q) was 
not. There was a conclusive presumption of not-r, i.e., L-r. By 
Theorem 8 that implies a finding of not-r and then, by Theorem 9, r 
was not found. Hence, the failure to find t must be based on the 
failure to find (p and q). But even if both P and q were found that 
would not imply that (p and q) was found. Theorem 15 requires 
47. The model may be used to construct a counterexample in which there is a world 
in which t is not found, not-r is necessary, and "if p and q is found and r is not found, then 
t is found" is necessary, yet in which p is found. Such a counter-example shows that F-p 
should not be provable in the logic. One such counter-example is presented in Appendix 
3. 
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that one conjunct be found and the other be necessary, before the 
conjunction must be taken as found. 
The analysis was valuable. Intuitively, it would appear that the court 
would simply have to decide that q was found before deciding that the 
failure to find t depended on a failure to find p. Rather, the analysis 
reveals that the court must conclude that q was conceptually necessary, 
before it may conclude that p was not found. 48 
Even when the logic presented here does not lead to a proof that 
something was or was not found, an analysis guided by the logic may 
clarify the problem. It may serve to identify the cause of the failure of 
logical proof. It makes clear the claims that the court must argue from 
a non-formal point of view, through an examination of the evidence and 
a determination of what the jury must or could have found, in order to 
come to a conclusion on a collateral estoppel question. 
It is hoped that the logic developed here will help in attaining the 
"rationality" that is expected of collateral estoppel analysis. The rigor 
of a formal system has had such an effect wherever employed. The de-
velopment of such a system for the analysis of fact finding should have a 
similar effect, and even if the systems are not employed formally, their 
study should help to clarify for the reader what form an informal analy-
sis must approximate to be rational. 
48. If the instruction had instead been that if p was found and q was found and r was 
not found then t must be found, the first-blush analysis would have been correct. The 
court would only have to conclude that q was found before concluding that p was not 
found. On this issue see L. COHEN, supra note 16, at 58-67. 
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APPENDIX I: PROOFS OF THEOREMS 
Proofs of theorems will consist of a series of well formed formulae the 
last of which is the thesis to be proved. Each formula in the series will 
either be an axiom, a previously proved theorem, formula derived from 
earlier formulae in the series, or a dischargeable hypothesis under the 
deduction theorem or indirect inference. The dischargeable hypothesis 
must actually be discharged before the proof is complete and any steps 
dependent on the dischargeable hypothesis may not be used after the 
hypothesis is discharged. Assumptions may also be included, but the 
resulting conclusions will be assumption-dependent and will not be the-
ses. Each step in a proof will be justified by indicating its status as an 
axiom, assumption or theorem, or by indicating any transformation 
rules and previous steps involved. Lastly, since any thesis of the pro-
positional calculus is also a thesis of FMn, rather than reprove each 
such thesis, they may be listed as steps and justified as "PC Thesis." 
Theorem 8: Fp-+F(pvq). 
(1) Fp Dis Hyp, DT 
(2) p-+(pvq) PC Thesis 
(3) L(P-+(pvq» 2, Necessitation 
(4) Fp&L(P-+(pvq» 1, 3, CI 
(5) (Fp&L(p-+(pvq»}-+F(pvq) All (Uniform Substitution) 
(6) F(pvq) 4, 5, Modus Ponens 
(7) Fp-+F(pvq) DT, Dis 1 
The justification for step (1) indicates a dischargeable hypothesis for 
use with the deduction theorem. The justification for step (7) indicates 
that the deduction theorem has been employed and the hypothesis in 
step (1) discharged. 
Theorem 9: F~p-+-Fp 
(1) ~(F~p-+~Fp) 
(2) ~(F~p-+~FpHF~p&~ ~Fp) 
(3) F~p&~ ~Fp 
(4) ~~Fp-Fp 
(5) F~p&Fp 
(6) (F~P&FpHFp&F~p) 
(7) Fp&F~p 
(8) -(Fp&F ~p) 
(9) (Fp&F ~p)&-(Fp&F ~p) 
(10) F~p-+~Fp 
Dis Hyp, II 
PC Thesis (Uniform Substitution) 
1, 2, Modus Ponens 
PC Thesis (Uniform Substitution) 
3, 4 Substitution of Equivalents 
PC Thesis (Uniform Substitution) 
5, 6, Modus Ponens 
A8 
7,8, CI 
II, Dis 1 
The justification for steps (1) and (10) indicate indirect inference. 
Theorem 10: Fq-+F(p-+q) 
(1) Fq 
(2) Fq-+F(qv~p) 
(3) F(qv~p) 
Dis Hyp, DT 
Theorem 8 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
1, 2, Modus Ponens 
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(4) (qv-p)-(p-+q) 
(5) L«qv-p)-(p-+q» 
(6) F(p-+q) 
(7) Fq __ F(p-+q) 
Theorem 11: F(p&q)--F(pvq) 
(1) F(p&q) 
(2) F(p&q)--(Fp&Fq) 
(3) Fp&Fq 
(4) Fp 
(5) Fp-+F(pvq) 
(6) F(pvq) 
(7) F(p&q)--F(pvq) 
Theorem 12: (F(pvq)&L-p)--Fq 
(1) F(pvq)&L-p 
(2) F(pvq) 
(3) (pvq)-( - p-+q) 
(4) L«pvq)-( -p-+q» 
(5) F(-p--v 
(6) L-p 
(7) L-p&F( -p-+q) 
(8) (L-p&F(-p--v)--Fq 
(9) Fq 
(10) (F(pvq)&L-p)--Fq 
Theorem 13: -F(pvq)--(-Fp&-Fq) 
(1) -(-F(pvqH-Fp&-Fq» 
(2) -( -F(pvq)--
( - Fp& - Fq)H - F(pvq)& - (-Fp& - Fq» 
(3) -F(pvq)&-(-Fp&-Fq) 
(4) -F(pvq) 
(5) -(-Fp&-Fq) 
(6) -(-Fp&-Fq)--(FpvFq) 
(7) FpvFq 
(8) Fp-+F(pvq) 
(9) Fq __ F(qvp) 
(10) (qvp)-(pvq) 
(11) L«qvp)-(pvq» 
(12) Fq __ F(pvq) 
(13) (FpvFq)--F(pvq) 
(14) F(pvq) 
(15) F(pvq)& - F(pvq) 
(16) - F(pvq)--( - Fp& - Fq) 
PC Thesis 
4, Necessitation 
3, 5, Substitution of Strict 
Equivalents 
DT, Dis 1 
Dis Hyp, DT 
A9 
I, 2, Modus Ponens 
3, CS 
Theorem 8 
4, 5, Modus Ponens 
DT, Dis 1 
Dis Hyp, DT 
I, CS 
PC Thesis 
3, Necessitation 
2, 4, Substitution of Strict 
Equivalents 
I, CS 
5,6, CI 
AlO (Uniform 
Substitution) 
7, 8, Modus Ponens 
DT, Dis 1 
DisHyp, II 
PC Thesis (Uniform 
Substitution) 
I, 2, Modus Ponens 
3, CS 
3, CS 
PC Thesis (Uniform 
Substitution) 
5, 6, Modus Ponens 
Theorem 8 
Theorem 8 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
PC Thesis 
10, Necessitation 
9, II, Substitution of 
Equivalents 
8, 12, IC 
7, 13, Modus Ponens 
4, 14, CI 
II, Dis 1 
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Theorem 14: L(p-+qHFp-.Fq) 
(I) L(p-.q) 
(2) Fp 
(3) Fp&L(p-.q) 
(4) (Fp&L(p-.q))---.Fq 
(5)Fq 
(6) Fp-.Fq 
(7) L(p-.q)---+(Fp-.Fq) 
Theorem 15: (LP&Fq)---.F(p&q) 
(I) p-.{q4Jl&q» 
(2) L(p-.{q--(p&q») 
(3) L(Hq--(p&q»HLp-.L(q4Jl&q») 
(4) Lp-.L(q--(p&q» 
(5) L(q4Jl&q)HFq-+F(P&q» 
(6) Lp 
(7) L(q--(p&q» 
(8) Fq-+F(p&q) 
(9) Lp-.{Fq-+F(p&q» 
(10) (Lp-.{Fq-+F(p&q»H(Lp&Fq)-+F(p&q» 
(II) (LP&Fq)-+F(p&q) 
Theorem 16: Fp-.Mp 
(I) Fp 
(2) -Mp 
(3) L-J>--M--p 
(4) --J>-p 
(5)L-J>--Mp 
(6) -Mp-.L-p 
(7) L-p 
(8) L-p-.F-p 
(9) F-p 
(10) Fp&F-p 
(II) -(Fp&F-p) 
(12) (Fp&F -p)&-(Fp&F -p) 
(13) Mp 
(14) Fp-.Mp 
Theorem 17: p-.Mp 
(I) L-p-.-p 
(2) (L-p-.-p)---.(p-.-L-p) 
(3) p-.-L-p 
(4) p-.Mp 
Dis Hyp, DT 
Dis Hyp, DT 
I, 2, CI 
All 
3, 4, Modus Ponens 
DT, Dis 2 
DT, Dis I 
PC Thesis 
I, Necessitation 
A6 (Uniform Substitution) 
2, 3, Modus Ponens 
Theorem 14 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
Dis Hyp, DT 
4, 6, Modus Ponens 
5, 7, Modus Ponens 
DT, Dis 6 
PC Thesis (Uniform 
Substitution) 
9, 10, Modus Ponens 
Dis Hyp, DT 
Dis Hyp, II 
Theorem 2 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
PC Thesis 
3, 4, Substitution of 
Equivalents 
5, CS 
2, 6, Modus Ponens 
A 7 (Uniform Substitution) 
7, 8, Modus Ponens 
1,9, CI 
A8 
10, 11, CI 
II, Dis 2 
DT, Dis 1 
A5 (Uniform Substitution) 
PC Thesis (Uniform 
Substitution) 
I, 2, Modus Ponens 
3, Substitution of 
Equivalents (Definition 
of "M") 
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Theorem 23: FLp---+Fp 
(l)Lp---+p 
(2) L(Lp---+p) 
(3) L(Lp---+p~(FLp---+Fp) 
(4) FLp---+Fp 
Theorem 24: MFp---+Mp 
(1) Fp---+Mp 
(2) L(Fp---+Mp) 
(3) L(Fp---+Mp~(MFp---+MMp) 
(4) MFp---+MMp 
(5) Mp++MMp 
(6) MFp---+Mp 
Theorem 25: LFp---+Fp 
(1) LFp---+Fp 
Theorem 26: FFp---+Mp 
(1) Fp---+Mp 
(2) L(Fp---+Mp) 
(3) L(Fp---+Mp~(FFp---+FMp) 
(4) FFp---+FMp 
(5) FMp---+Mp 
(6) (FFp---+FMp)&(FMp---+Mp) 
(7) «FFp---+Fmp)&(FMp---+Mp )HFFp---+Mp) 
(8) FFp---+Mp 
Theorem 27: LMFp---+LMp 
(1) MFp---+Mp 
(2) L(MFp---+Mp) 
(3) L(MFp---+Mp~(LMFp---+LMp) 
(4) LMFp---+LMp 
Theorem 28: MLFp---+MFp 
(1) LFp---+Fp 
(2) L(LFp---+Fp) 
(3) L(LFp---+FpHMLFp---+MFp) 
(4) MLFp---+MFp 
Theorem 29: LMLFp---+MFp 
(1) LMLFp 
(2) LMLFp---+MLFp 
(3) MLFp 
(4) LFp---+Fp 
(5) L(LFp---+Fp) 
(6) L(LFp---+Fp~(MLFp---+MFp) 
A5 
1, Necessitation 
Theorem 14 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
2, 3, Modus Ponens 
Theorem 16 
1, Necessitation 
Theorem 14 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
2, 3, Modus Ponens 
Theorem 19 
4, 5, Substitution of 
Equivalents 
A5 (Uniform Substitution) 
Theorem 16 
1, Necessitation 
Theorem 14 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
2, 3, Modus Ponens 
A13 
4,5, CI 
PC Thesis (Uniform 
Substitution) 
6, 7, Modus Ponens 
Theorem 24 
1, Necessitation 
A6 (Uniform Substitution) 
2, 3, Modus Ponens 
A5 (Uniform Substitution) 
1, Necessitation 
Theorem 7 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
2, 3, Modus Ponens 
Dis Hyp, DT 
A5 (Uniform Substitution) 
1,2, Modus Ponens 
A5 (Uniform Substitution) 
4, Necessitation 
Theorem 7 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
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(7) MLFp-+MFp 
(8) MFp 
(9) LMLFp-+MFp 
Theorem 30: MLMFp-+MFp 
(l)MLMFp 
(2) LMFp-+MFp 
(3) L(LMFp-+MFp) 
(4) L(LMFp-+MFpHMLMFp-+MMFp) 
(5) MLMFp-+MMFp 
(6)MMFp 
(7) MFp_MMFp 
(8) MMFp-+MFp 
(9) MFp 
(10) MLMFp-+MFp 
Theorem 31: FLMLp-+MLp 
(1) FLMLp 
(2) FLMLp-+FMLp 
(3) FMLp 
(4) FMLp-+MLp 
(5) MLp 
(6) FLMLp-+MLp 
Theorem 32: FMLMp-+Mp 
(1) FMLMp-+MLMp 
(2) MLMp-+Mp 
(3) (FMLMp-+MLMp)&(MLMp-+Mp) 
(4) «FMLMp-+MLMp)&(MLMp-+Mp»)--. 
(FMLMp-+Mp) 
(5) FMLMp-+Mp 
Theorem 33: FMLp-+MLp 
(1) FMLp-+MLp 
Theorem 34: FLMp-+FMp 
(1) LMp-+Mp 
(2) L(LMp-+Mp) 
(3) L(LMp-+MpHFLMp-+FMp) 
(4) FLMp-+FMp 
5, 6, Modus Ponens 
3, 7, Modus Ponens 
DT, Dis 1 
Dis Hyp, DT 
A5 (Uniform Substitution) 
2, Necessitation 
Theorem 7 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
3, 4, Modus Ponens 
1, 5, Modus Ponens 
Theorem 19 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
7, CS (Definition of "-") 
6, 8, Modus Ponens 
DT, Dis 1 
Dis Hyp, DT 
Theorem 23 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
1,2, Modus Ponens 
A13 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
3, 4, Modus Ponens 
DT, Dis 1 
A13 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
Theorem 22 
1,2, CI 
PC Thesis (Uniform 
Substitution) 
3, 4, Modus Ponens 
A13 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
A5 (Uniform Substitution) 
1, Necessitation 
Theorem 14 (Uniform 
Substitution) 
2, 3, Modus Ponens 
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APPENDIX 2: FS4 COUNTEREXAMPLES 
The figure below shows that Axiom A 13 should not have been 
strengthened to a biconditional. Mp is true in H but FMp is false in H, 
so Mp FMp fails to hold in the model. 
P 
Mp 
-FMp 
H 
The following figure shows that Axiom A 13 cannot be strengthened 
to FMp-Fp. FMp is true in H but Fp is false. 
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The converse of Theorem 23, Fp-+FLp, does not hold in the model. 
Fp is true in H, while FLp is false. 
Nor may Theorem 23 be strengthened by changing the consequent to 
Lp, since FLp-+Lp does not hold in the model. 
The converse of Theorem 24, Mp-MFp, does not hold in the model, 
as the following counterexample shows. Mp is true in H, but MFp is 
not. 
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The theorem may also not be strengthened to MFp-+Fp, and hence not 
to MFp-+Lp, as is shown by the figure below. 
The following diagram shows that the converse of Theorem 25, Fp-
-+LFp, does not hold in the model. 
The theorem may also not be strengthened to LFp-+Lp, as is shown 
below. 
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The converse of Theorem 26, Mp---+FFp, also fails in the model. 
The theorem may also not be strengthened to FFp---+Fp, as shown by the 
figure below. The reflexive loops have been omitted but each world 
does have access to itself. There is also an omitted arrow from H to 
each of the bottom row of worlds, as required by transitivity. 
The converse of Theorem 27, LMp-LMFp, should not be expected 
to hold. 
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Another counterexample shows that LMFp-LMp cannot be 
strengthened by changing the consequent of the conditional to Lp or 
LFp or even Fp, if we are to remain true to the model. 
As the following figure shows, the converse of Theorem 28, 
MFp-MLFp, fails to hold in the model. 
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-
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The theorem may also not be strengthened to MLFp~Fp or 
MLFp~FFp. 
The converse of Theorem 29, MFp~LMLFp, also fails in the model, 
as is shown below. 
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Nor may Theorem 29 be strengthened to LMLFp~Fp. 
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The following figure shows that the converse of Theorem 30, 
MFp-+MLMFp, fails to hold in the model. 
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Nor may the theorem be strengthened to either MLMFp-Fp or 
MLMFp-FFp. 
Theorems 31-34 involve instances of FLp or FMp and a strengthening 
of those theorems would depend on a strengthening of the FS4 axiom or 
of earlier theorems - strengthening that would not hold in the model. 
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APPENDIX 3: PROOFS AND COUNTEREXAMPLE FOR 
SECTION IV: APPLICATIONS 
Example A: 
(I) F(pvq) 
(2) Fv 
(3) Ls 
(4) L-p 
(5) -F-r 
(6) -F-r~Fr 
(7) L(v~t) 
(8) L««Fq&Fr)&Fs)&Ft~Fu) 
(9) F(pvq)&L-p 
(10) (F(pvq)&L-p~Fq 
(II) Fq 
(12) Fr 
(13) Ls~Fs 
(14) Fs 
(15) Fv&L(v~t) 
(16) (Fv&L(v~t»~Ft 
(17) Ft 
(18) L««Fq&Fr)&Fs)&Ft~Fu~ 
««Fq&Fr)&Fs)&Ft~Fu) 
(19) «(Fq&Fr)&Fs)&Ft)~Fu 
(20) «(Fq&Fr)&Fs)&Ft 
(21) Fu 
Example B: 
(1) -Fp 
(2) L(F(qvr)~Fp) 
(3) -F-q~Fq 
(4) L(F(qvr)~Fp~(F(qvr~Fp) 
(5) F(qvr)~Fp 
(6) (F(qvr)~Fp)& - Fp 
(7) «F(qvr)~Fp)&-Fp~- F(qvr) 
(8) - F(qvr) 
(9) - F(qvr~( - Fq& - Fr) 
(10) -Fq&-Fr 
(II) -Fq 
(12) (-F -q~Fq)~(-Fq~F -q) 
(13) - Fq~F-q 
(14) F-q 
Example C: 
Assumption 
Assumption 
Assumption 
Assumption 
Assumption 
Assumption 
Assumption 
Assumption 
1,4, CI 
Theorem 12 
9, 10, Modus Ponens 
5, 6, Modus Ponens 
A 7 (Uniform Substitution) 
3, 13, Modus Ponens 
2,7, CI 
All (Uniform Substitution) 
15, 16, Modus Ponens 
AS (Uniform Substitution) 
8, 18, Modus Ponens 
11,12,14,17, CI, CI, CI 
19, 20, Modus Ponens 
Assumption 
Assumption 
Assumption 
AS (Uniform Substitution 
2, 4, Modus Ponens 
1, 5, CI 
PC Thesis (Uniform Substitution) 
6, 7, Modus Ponens 
Theorem 13 (Uniform Substitu-
tion) 
8, 9, Modus Ponens 
10, CS 
PC Thesis (Uniform Substitution) 
3, 12, Modus Ponens 
11, 13, Modus Ponens 
A single world model in which p is true and q, rand t are false pro-
vides such a counterexample. 
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p 
-q 
-r 
-t 
-Ft 
L-r 
L«F(p&q)& - Fr}->Ff) 
Fp 
Since t is false in Hand H has access only to itself, t is not found in 
H. Since r is false in H, and again H has access only to itself, - r is 
necessary in H. The third assumption, the jury instruction, is more dif-
ficult to derive but follows from the falsity of q. Since q is false, so is 
p&q. Since p&q is false in Hand H has access only to itself, p&q is not 
found in H. Therefore, it cannot be that p&q is found and r is not 
found. Since a false antecedent makes a conditional true, 
((F(p&q)& -Fr}--+Ft is true in H, and since H has access only to itself, 
the conditional is necessarily true in H. Hence, all the assumptions are 
true in H, yet since p is true in Hand H has access only to itself, p is 
found in H. 
